Sun Tzu’s saying “The highest art of war is to defeat the enemy without fighting” in his manual “The Art of War” perfectly captures China’s stance on Taiwan, as China is currently exerting pressure, isolation, and control over Taiwan without direct military conflict. Specifically, China is conducting cyberattacks, disinformation, and psychological warfare campaigns aimed at destabilizing Taiwan and undermining citizens’ trust in their government.

Taiwan, under the leadership of President Lai Ching-te, is responding by modernizing its armed forces, increasing defense spending, and conducting extensive military exercises to strengthen its defense capabilities. At the same time, it has begun to develop new technologies such as unmanned vessels and invest in cyber defense. On the political level, Beijing’s strong rhetoric against Lai, following his statements in favor of a peaceful resolution and his reference to Donald Trump, shows China’s distrust of any attempt at international mediation.

At the international level, the European Union and the United States have expressed concern about China’s stance, stressing that the UN resolution recognizing China does not cover the case of Taiwan. At the same time, military and diplomatic moves in the region, such as the new alliances currently forming in the Indo-Pacific, reflect an effort to limit Chinese influence. China, for its part, continues to exert pressure without opting for direct military conflict at this stage, implementing a “gray zone” strategy that combines threats, exercises, and public opinion to weaken Taiwan from within.

As China intensifies its military activities around Taiwan, QUAD member countries are being forced to redefine their roles and priorities. The United States is pushing for more active military involvement from its allies, with joint exercises, information sharing, and force deployment at strategic points in the Indo-Pacific. Japan has already strengthened its defenses in its southern islands, near Taiwan, while Australia, through the AUKUS alliance, is acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, making the QUAD’s naval presence more effective against China.

However, pressure from China is causing cracks within QUAD. India, which has complex relations with Beijing and seeks strategic autonomy, is cautious about any direct involvement in Taiwan. Thus, the QUAD is gradually transforming from a flexible cooperation mechanism into a field of internal imbalance as the US and Japan seek to deter China through military readiness, while India and Australia try to keep open channels of communication with Beijing. The result is a more “militarized but also fragile” QUAD, where the Taiwan crisis acts as a catalyst for its cohesion — or possible disintegration.

China’s increasing pressure on Taiwan affects the United States on multiple levels, as Washington considers Taiwan a critical pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy. If Beijing succeeds in controlling the island, it will gain the ability to project military power deeper into the Pacific, directly threatening allies such as Japan and the Philippines. This is forcing the US to strengthen its presence in the region with a fleet, bases, and joint exercises, but at the same time increasing the risk of direct confrontation with China.

At the same time, Taiwan is a global center for microchip production, and China’s potential control of it would deal a serious blow to US technological and industrial superiority.

On a political and economic level, the crisis is intensifying competition between Washington and Beijing and causing internal pressures on the American political scene. Republicans are calling for a tougher stance in favor of Taiwan, while Democrats are trying to strike a balance between deterrence and avoiding military escalation. At the same time, the US is seeking “technological independence” from China by investing in domestic chip production and strengthening alliances with Japan and Australia.

However, China’s pressure on Taiwan is acting as a catalyst, forcing the United States to maintain a strong deterrent stance without being drawn into an open conflict with unpredictable consequences.

China’s pressure on Taiwan has, paradoxically, created strategic benefits for India, which is exploiting geopolitical instability to consolidate its position as an autonomous regional power. As the United States and its allies seek new partners in Asia to counterbalance China, New Delhi is emerging as the most reliable and independent power center. Without getting directly involved in the Taiwan crisis, India is strengthening its diplomatic influence within the QUAD and gaining strategic leverage, as all the major powers seek to keep it on their side. With this stance, India is emerging as a “balancing force” — a power that prevents polarization but at the same time enjoys the benefits of its increased geopolitical value.

At the same time, the economic dimension of the crisis further strengthens India’s momentum. Global companies concerned about a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait are shifting part of their production from China to India in a process of “China+1” strategic diversification.

New Delhi is thus emerging as a new center of industrial and technological development, attracting investment, capital, and international prestige. With a combination of realism and strategic composure, India is managing to capitalise on the Taiwan crisis, transforming itself from a regional player into a global balancer.

The situation does not seem to be able to be resolved smoothly and, unfortunately, the most realistic scenario for the future is that Beijing will attempt to restrict maritime and air access to and from Taiwan with a combination of additional measures such as permanent patrols by warships and landing craft, mining strategic channels, establishing regional no-fly zones, and missile threats against shipping lanes.

The goal would not necessarily be to completely suffocate Taiwan, but to create economically unsustainable conditions for the island with supply disruptions, higher ship insurance costs, and frozen investment flows, with the aim of isolating the island and putting political pressure on its internal affairs.

In the event of a blockade, the US and the QUAD naval forces will face a double dilemma: to attempt an open challenge to the Chinese blockade at the risk of conflict, or to limit themselves to an informal “strategic deterrence.” This is precisely where India’s scope for action lies: the ability to act as a naval bridge, an alternative supply hub, and a regional security provider. Supporting the transit of goods, humanitarian aid, and coordinated naval outposts will increase its international prestige.

The challenge for both the US and the QUAD will be to formulate a common operational plan without forcing India into direct confrontation with China. New Delhi will want to avoid direct confrontation with China but may at the same time take advantage diplomatically.

India can move forward with four lines of action. First, it can attempt to upgrade its navy and operational presence, as well as accelerate the construction of frigates and submarines with permanent naval bases in Andaman and Nicobar (a group of islands in the Bay of Bengal, at the eastern tip of India, between Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia). Second, it must strengthen naval cooperation with Singapore, Japan, and Australia.

Thirdly, this is the moment when India is taking diplomatic leadership by assuming the role of safe passage provider and humanitarian aid coordinator, offering “safe routes” for critical supply chains. Fourthly, India will proceed to attract companies that are leaving the unstable situation in China for economic and industrial reasons. Among these companies, semiconductor manufacturers will play an important role, finding safe ground in India. If New Delhi steadily advances these steps in 2026–2027, it will increase the strategic dependence of many countries on India — and thus become the most influential regional player without having to clash directly with Beijing.

In conclusion, India is gaining geopolitical influence and operational power, as a larger naval presence requires resources and the country can free itself from Chinese pressure by implementing the “Make in India” model. India’s successful presence as a “safe hub” in East Asia will attract foreign investment, but at the same time will make India a target for Chinese economic countermeasures or military pressure at the border.

The critical point of balance is India’s ability to remain strategically self-sufficient, i.e., even though it cooperates with both the US and the QUAD, it does not depend entirely on foreign guarantees. It therefore appears that the next country to implement Sun Tzu’s maxim, which China is currently applying, will be India.